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It is argued in this article that due diligence, grounded on positive duties under inter-
national human rights law, is a standard against which to measure the performance 
of UN peacekeeping forces. Its adoption by the UN will improve accountability, but in 
a controlled and principled way. A requirement that the UN act diligently to prevent 
human rights violations would not impose over-onerous obligations. For responsibil-
ity to be incurred an organisation must have clearly failed to take measures that were 
within its power to take. It is argued that the UN not only should be bound by norms of 
due diligence but is in fact bound by positive obligations derived from customary in-
ternational human rights law. The development of some due diligence-type measures 
by the UN to prevent sexual abuse by peacekeepers and to protect civilians within 
areas of peacekeeper deployment, and the adoption of an explicit due diligence policy 
to delineate its relationship with non-UN security actors, are positive signs. Howev-
er, the article demonstrates that the UN needs to further internalise and develop its 
due diligence obligations if it is to limit human rights violations committed under its 
watch. Furthermore, it needs to create accountability mechanisms to ensure that it 
develops the rather limited measures taken thus far, including provision for victims 
to be able to hold the organisation to account for failure to protect them from human 
rights  violations. Only by accepting its responsibility and liability to such victims will 
be the UN be driven to improve its due diligence when mandating, preparing, training, 
deploying and directing peacekeeping operations.
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Nottingham; Visiting Professor Graduate School of International Cooperation Studies, Kobe 
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1 Introduction**
In a sense arguments over the immunity and accountability of the UN have 
obscured the ongoing uncertainty over the primary and secondary rules of in-
ternational law applicable to the UN when undertaking peacekeeping. It is 
necessary to understand what violations of international law have been com-
mitted by the UN before any attempt is made to assess whether immunity 
should prevent access to justice before national courts and whether alternative 
methods of settlement are required.
Accountability generally improves in response to pressures exerted or re-
leased after or during crises or scandals.1 However, the UN seems to be inured 
to such pressures. Sexual abuse and exploitation (sea) by peacekeepers con-
tinues as do failures to take adequate measures to protect civilians from vio-
lence in areas where peacekeepers are deployed. The UN has hidden behind 
its cloak of immunity when faced with mass claims arising from the genocide 
in Srebrenica and from the cholera epidemic in Haiti. Moreover, it has failed to 
stop the epidemic of sea that runs across UN peacekeeping operation like an 
open sore. The scandals and crises attached to these human rights violations 
do not seem to have improved the UN’s accountability. The fear of exposure 
to mass claims only partly explains the UN’s continued reliance on absolute 
immunity as provided by the Convention on Privileges and Immunities 1946, 
and its reluctance to establish the type of claims commissions delivering non-
judicial redress promised in every peacekeeping status-of-forces-agreement 
(sofa) but never delivered.2
1 Richard Mulgan, ‘awb and oil for food: some issues of accountability’ in Jeremy Farrall and 
Kim Rubenstein (eds) Sanctions, Accountability and Governance in a Globalised World (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 334.
2 UN Doc. A/res/45/594, 9 October 1990, para. 51.
** This article develops some of the themes found in Nigel D. White, ‘Due Diligence, the UN 
and Peacekeeping’ in Heike Krieger and Anne Peters (eds), Due Diligence in International Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2021).
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2 Due Diligence as a Standard
One solution to the lack of clarity in the primary and secondary rules applica-
ble to the UN is to recognise that due diligence is applicable to the UN. In gen-
eral, due diligence ‘has become a short hand reference to a set of criteria for 
assessing the level of care’ provide by state authorities,3 and it is argued here 
other international legal persons whose actions impact upon individuals. 
More specifically this signifies that the UN should take care to ensure that 
those actors it has mandated and over whom it exercises authority do not act 
in a way that causes damage, injury or loss, or fail to act to prevent damage, 
injury or loss, especially when that is a result of their internationally wrongful 
conduct.
Due diligence obligations are found in various areas of international law,4 
but are particularly developed in international human rights law as a result of 
the positive obligations placed on states to ensure the protection of human 
rights of individuals within their jurisdiction. Under international human 
rights law a state’s ‘obligations in relation to the actions of third parties are of-
ten expressed in terms of due diligence’, meaning that the state can be ‘held 
liable for human rights violations caused by a third party where the state has 
failed to exercise due diligence to prevent the violation or to respond as 
required’.5 Extending this standard to the UN entails accepting the premise 
that the UN is bound by customary international law and that positive obliga-
tions are found in customary human rights law or, indeed, are emerging as cus-
tomary norms, given that the UN is not a party to the human rights treaties 
which contain such positive duties. These issues will be returned to. Further-
more, extending due diligence to the UN as a legal obligation also depends 
upon whether the UN exerts sufficient authority and control in a host state 
through its peacekeeping force for human rights obligations to attach to it. On 
the latter point, the Human Rights Committee felt that the obligations of troop 
contributing nations (tcns) to ensure the human rights of individuals within 
their power or control applied extraterritorially when their troops formed part 
of a peacekeeping mission.6 These are treaty obligations of tcns drawn from 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, but it is argued that 
3 Joanna Kulesza, Due Diligence in International Law (Leiden: Nijhoff, 2016), p. 1.
4 Ibid, p. 11 for the further argument that due diligence is ‘a principle of international law’.
5 ila Study Group on Due Diligence in International Law, ‘Second Report’, 12 July 2016, p. 32, 
citing Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Inter-Am.Ct.H.R. (Ser. C) No. 4 
(1988), para. 172.
6 Human Rights Committee General Comment 31, ‘Nature of the General Legal Obligation on 
State Parties to the Covenant’, ccpr/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004), para. 10.
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their customary equivalents apply to the UN as an international legal person 
having rights and duties under international law and exercising authority and 
control over individuals through its peacekeepers.7
This would mean that if the UN does not act diligently to prevent human 
rights violations when it has the power to do so then it would be responsible 
and accountable to those suffering harms as a result of those violations. If the 
UN does not waive its immunity before domestic courts when faced with 
claims arising from its failures, it will have to establish alternative methods of 
settlement. Placing its conduct within a human rights due diligence paradigm 
will, it is argued, put genuine pressure on the UN either to reform itself regard-
ing immunity and dispute settlement or face the consequences of its intransi-
gence. If the UN remains unchanged then the possibility arises of domestic 
courts and host governments being less amenable to its stance on immunity. 
Host states often desperately need UN assistance but not at any cost. It is ar-
gued that the adoption of due diligence as a standard against which to mea-
sure the performance of UN peacekeeping forces will improve accountability, 
but in a controlled and principled way.8 A requirement that the UN act dili-
gently to prevent harm being caused by human rights violations would not 
impose over-onerous obligations. For responsibility to be incurred, it must be 
demonstrated that the UN had ‘manifestly failed to take all measures’ that 
were ‘within its power’ to take.9 It is argued that the UN not only should be 
bound by norms of due diligence but is in fact bound, although disputes about 
the nature and extent of such obligations remain to be fully resolved. Never-
theless, reflecting its position as a leading human rights norm creator and pro-
motor, the UN needs to internalise these norms as a first step towards empow-
ering victims to hold the organisation to account if it manifestly fails to protect 
them from human rights violations when it had the power to do so.
3 An Appropriate Normative Framework for Peacekeeping
Due diligence is argued to be an appropriate way to view the UN’s human 
rights obligations. This is because the UN itself does not directly perform 
7 Terry D. Gill, Dieter Fleck, William H. Boothby and Alfons Vanheusden, Leuven Manual on the 
International Law Applicable to Peace Operations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2017), p. 76, p. 78.
8 For ideas for the development of an accountability framework for peacekeeping operations 
see the contribution of Norihito Samata in this issue.
9 ila Study Group, supra note 5, p. 8, citing, inter alia, Application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and 
Montenegro) Judgment (2007) icj Reports, p. 43, para. 430.
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peacekeeping but relies on forms of ‘outsourcing’ to states and occasionally, for 
restricted purposes, to private security contractors.10 Indeed, given that char-
acteristic of peacekeeping it can be argued that the UN’s human rights obliga-
tions under customary international law ‘are best operationalized in a more 
general fashion, though the prism of due diligence’.11 The UN, unlike states, 
does ‘not possess a general competence’,12 meaning that ‘the precise catalogue 
of rights and duties is … impossible to list in advance’.13 This proposition ap-
plies within specific regimes, including human rights law. According to Queniv-
et, ‘customary human rights only applies to those UN activities that are related 
to its purposes and functions and have an impact on human rights’.14 The UN 
exercises certain public powers (of arrest, detention, and the use of force) 
alongside host governments and its peacekeepers may have varying degrees of 
control over parts of the country and over individuals within it.15 Furthermore, 
the UN has a significant degree of authority over peacekeepers.16 In these cir-
cumstances duties of due diligence are an appropriate way of understanding 
the application of human rights law to UN peacekeeping operations. In a sense 
due diligence under human rights law in not an additional element to the UN’s 
‘normal’ human rights duties, it seeks to define the core human rights duties 
applicable to operational organisations such as the UN.
It is not possible to say that when a UN peacekeeper acts their actions auto-
matically are actions of the UN. Peacekeepers are not agents of the UN, they 
remain agents of the state and part of a state organ of the troop contributing 
10 Mirko Sossai, ‘The Privatisation of the Core Business of UN Peacekeeping Operations: 
Any Legal Limit?’, International Community Law Review, vol. 16, 2014, p. 405. On the more 
widespread UN practice of outsourcing non-security functions to contractors see the con-
tribution by Martina Buscemi in this issue.
11 Ellen Campbell el al, ‘Due Diligence Obligations of International Organizations under 
International Law’, New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, vol. 50, 
2018, p. 558, citing Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors 
( Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 151.
12 Noelle Quenivet, ‘Binding the United Nations to Customary (Human Rights) Law’, Inter-
national Organizations Law Review, vol. 17, 2020, p. 399.
13 Malcolm Shaw, International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 7th edn, 2014), 
p. 192.
14 Quenivet, supra note 12, p. 400.
15 Gill, Fleck, Boothby and Vanheusdan, supra note 7, pp. 267–8.
16 ‘Operational authority’ has been defined by the UN as ‘[t]he authority transferred by the 
member states to the United Nations to use the operational capabilities of their national 
military contingents … to undertake mandated missions and tasks’, which in peacekeep-
ing operations ‘is vested in the Secretary-General, under the authority of the Security 
Council’ involving ‘the full authority to issue operational directives’ – undpko and dfs, 
‘Authority, Command and Control in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations’, 15 Febru-
ary 2008, para. 7.
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nation (tcn).17 The rules on attribution of conduct agreed by the International 
Law Commission (ilc) reflect this. In the Articles on the Responsibility of In-
ternational Organisations (ario) 2011, the preferred test for peacekeeping op-
erations, according to the ilc, is Article 7,18 which states that the conduct of an 
organ of a state, in this case the military, placed at the disposal of the UN shall 
be considered an act of the UN if the organisation ‘exercises effective control 
over that conduct’.19 The ilc stated that this was applicable to peacekeeping 
forces signifying that the tcn remains responsible for the conduct of its sol-
diers deployed as part of a UN peacekeeping force rather than the UN, unless it 
is shown that the UN is in effective control of the conduct in question. How-
ever, there is no explanation of why Article 6 of ario would not be an equally 
valid basis for attribution of conduct given that it provides that the conduct of 
organs of the organisation are acts of the organisation.20 The UN views peace-
keeping forces as subsidiary organs, indeed has indicated that on this basis it 
accepts responsibility for wrongful conduct committed by peacekeeping forc-
es during the course of their functions.21 This suggests that the ilc rules do not 
capture UN practice, nor do they necessarily reflect the law.22 A number of 
commentators have suggested that a more accurate starting point for attribu-
tion is a presumption that the conduct of a peacekeeping force is attributable 
to the organisation on the basis that it is a subsidiary organ of the UN. Howev-
er, this is a presumption that can be rebutted by evidence that the tcn remains 
in effective control of the wrongful conduct in question.23
17 Gill, Fleck, Boothby and Vanheusdan, supra note 7, p. 77.
18 United Nations, ilc Report of the Work of the Sixty-Third Session, UN Doc. A/66/10, 23 
April-3 June and 4 July-12 August 2011, p. 90.
19 Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations 2011 (ario), UN Doc. 
A/66/10, Article 7.
20 Ibid, Article 6.
21 UN Secretariat – ‘as a subsidiary organ of the United Nations, an act of a peacekeeping 
force is, in principle, imputable to the Organization, and if committed in violation of an 
international obligation entails the international responsibility of the Organization and 
its liability in compensation’ – UN Doc. A/cn.4/545 (2004), para. 17.
22 Gill, Fleck, Boothby and Vanheusden, supra note 7, p. 279: ‘[I]t is doubtful whether ario’s 
attempt to prescribe a single test of attribution applicable to all types of Peace Operations 
in the form of article 7 ario reflects the law as it currently stands. While the test of effec-
tive control is appropriate in some circumstances, in other priority should be given to the 
institutional paradigm of attribution’.
23 Aurel Sari, ‘UN Peacekeeping Operations and Article 7 ario: The Missing Link’, Interna-
tional Organizations Law Review, vol. 9, 2012, p. 78; Paolo Palchetti, ‘International Respon-
sibility for Conduct of UN Peace-keeping Forces: The Question of Attribution’ in Paolo 
Palchetti et al (eds), Refining Human Rights Obligations in Conflict Situations (The Hague: 
Asser, 2014) p. 24; Yohei Okada, ‘Effective control test at the interface between the law of 
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Viewing a peacekeeping operation in principle as a subsidiary organ of the 
UN does not override the fact that such an operation is made up of separate 
state organs in the form of contingents from tcns, each operating within a 
defined area of deployment, and each with their own command and disciplin-
ary structures.24 Although the UN has ‘operational authority’ over peacekeep-
ing through the Secretary General and Force Commander,25 this does not guar-
antee effective command and control of the conduct of peacekeepers on the 
ground. Evidence that the use of the so-called ‘Red Card’ whereby a tcn com-
mander may refuse to follow orders issued by the UN Force Commander after 
consulting with his government is readily found.26 Given the proscriptive na-
ture of a state’s military law and the hierarchical nature of national command 
structures, it can be presumed that soldiers are operating under national com-
mand and national rules of engagement (RoE) for at least some of the time 
while serving in international military operations, including blue-helmeted 
UN peacekeeping operations,27 despite the development of clearer RoE at UN 
level.28
This leads to an accountability gap or, more accurately, an accountability 
dilemma between the UN’s authority and overall command over peacekeeping 
operations and the tcns’ day-to-day control of peacekeepers. The dilemma is 
that the UN ought to have human rights duties and not just the tcn for practi-
cal and ethical as well as legal reasons. If it were just tcns that bore responsi-
bility for human rights violations by their troops while on peacekeeping duty, 
then tcns would either operate mostly outside the UN command structure or 
would cease to contribute troops for fear of liability. This dilemma can be 
international responsibility and the law of international organizations: Managing con-
cerns over the attribution of UN peacekeepers’ conduct to troop-contributing nations’, 
Leiden Journal of International Law, vol. 32, 2019, p. 280; Gill, Fleck, Boothby and Vanheus-
den, supra note 7, p. 279. See further the contribution of Yohei Okada in this issue.
24 Gill, Fleck, Boothby and Vanheusden, supra note 7, p. 77.
25 undpko and dfs, supra note 16.
26 Ramesh Thakur and Dipankar Banerjee, ‘India: Democratic, Poor, Internationalist’ in 
Charlotte Ku and Harold Jacobson (eds), Democratic Accountability and the Use of Force in 
International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 198; Dale Stephens, 
‘The Lawful Use of Force by Peacekeeping Forces: The Tactical Imperative’, International 
Peacekeeping, vol. 12, 2005, p. 160.
27 Peter Rowe, ‘The United Nations Rules of Engagement and the British Soldier in Bosnia’, 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 43, 1994, p. 954.
28 Rob McLoughlin, ‘Some Rules of Engagement Legacies of the 1999 Report of the Indepen-
dent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda’, 
Journal of International Peacekeeping, vol. 22, 2018, pp. 311–12, discussing the ‘Guidelines 
for the Development of Rules of Engagement (roe) for United Nations Peacekeeping 
 Operations’, 15 May 2002 (md/fgs/0220.0001).
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 addressed by arguing that the UN has due diligence obligations in regard to the 
conduct of peacekeepers it has set in train. Peacekeepers remain soldiers of 
their sending states but they are also peacekeepers acting for the UN,29 mean-
ing that the UN should be diligent to ensure that peacekeepers operate within 
an institutional and procedural framework that includes respect for, and pro-
tection of, the human rights of the civilian population of the host state. In this 
way due diligence can fill a gap in an ‘era of “privatized” international 
relations’,30 because although the UN may not effectively control all of the ac-
tivities carried out under its authority, it still owes a duty of due diligence to 
those affected by such activities.
Although at this stage this remains an abstract contention – to the effect 
that the UN, as an international actor deploying armed forces with the con-
comitant potential for both harm and for preventing harm, ought to be bound 
by obligations of due diligence in a moral sense – it will be argued below that 
the UN is also bound in a legal sense. The purpose of this section is to establish 
that due diligence provides an appropriate standard against which to judge the 
UN in performing its peacekeeping function. The application, acceptance, and 
implementation of human rights due diligence obligations in UN peacekeep-
ing operations are considered in section 5 below. There is limited and uneven 
evidence of the development of standards and measures by the UN that would 
fit the meaning and purpose of due diligence, although there are very few in-
stances of due diligence being used as a term within the UN (with the excep-
tion of the quite narrowly conceived Human Rights Due Diligence Policy ad-
opted in relation to non-UN security forces).31 Nonetheless, the contention in 
this article is that due diligence obligations are applicable to the UN as primary 
rules of international law supported by secondary rules of responsibility.32 
This position is developed in the following section.
4 The Applicability of Due Diligence Obligations to UN Peacekeeping
While the above section established that the conditions are present whereby 
due diligence obligations can and should apply to the UN, it remains to be es-
tablished that the UN has duties under international law, including positive 
29 Gill, Fleck, Boothby and Vanheusden, supra note 7, p. 77.
30 Kulesza, supra note 3, p. 1.
31 ‘Human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations 
security forces’, UN Doc. A/67/775-S/2013/110, 5 March 2013.
32 Timo Koivurova, ‘Due Diligence’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), Max Planck Encyclopaedia of 
Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
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obligations under human rights law. Jan Klabbers for one is sceptical about 
whether the UN has significant obligations under international law, including 
international human rights law, and if it does not have primary obligations to 
behave in a certain way then it cannot be held responsible for a failure to do 
so.33 However, there is no explanation by Klabbers as to why the UN is not 
bound by customary international law, except a vague reference to the UN’s 
lack of consent to be bound.34 It is true as Klabbers states that a bystander can-
not be held liable for failing to rescue a drowning child unless it can be estab-
lished that there is a legal obligation to act and that the individual was in a 
position to do so.35 The UN is in a position to act in the sense of taking preven-
tive and other reasonable measures when it has a military force in a country in 
a way that it is not able to act in other situations where it has no force on the 
ground and, although the issue of its legal obligation to act remains contested,36 
it is argued that it does have such obligations under customary human rights 
law.
As an international legal person, a status implied from the provisions of the 
UN Charter indicating the organisation’s autonomy from member states, the 
UN possesses separate rights and duties on the international plane.37 More 
substantively, the International Court of Justice has declared that the UN is 
a subject of international law and as ‘as such’ is ‘bound by any obligations in-
cumbent upon’ it ‘under general rules of international law, under their consti-
tutions or under international agreements to which’ it is a party.38 Verdirame 
concludes that ‘the most plausible interpretation’ of the term ‘general rules 
of international law’ used by the Court is that it is shorthand ‘for customary 
international law of universal or quasi-universal applicability and for general 
33 Jan Klabbers, ‘Reflections on Role Responsibility: The Responsibility of International Or-
ganizations for Failing to Act’, European Journal of International Law, vol. 28, 2017, p. 1136. 
See also James Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013), p. 218.
34 Klabbers, supra note 33, p. 1149. He points to the unsg’s Bulletin on International Hu-
manitarian Law (UN Doc. st/sgb/1999/13, 6 August 1999) as an example of the UN con-
senting to some international norms. Rather than finding obligations in the primary rules 
of international law, Klabbers argues that obligations can be found in the broad mandate 
of the organisation – Klabbers, supra note 33, pp. 1137–43.
35 Ibid, p. 1150.
36 Frédéric, Mégret and Florian Hoffman, ‘The UN as a Human Rights Violator? Some Reflec-
tions on the UN’s Changing Human Rights Responsibility’, Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 
25, 2013, p. 314.
37 Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion 
(1949) icj Reports, p. 179.
38 Interpretation of the Agreement of March 1951 between the who and Egypt, Advisory Opin-
ion (1980) icj Reports, p. 90.
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 principles of law’.39 However, a strict consensual view of international law at 
least casts doubt upon the automatic attachment of customary human rights 
duties to the UN without its subsequent express or tacit consent,40 although 
the orthodox position is that unless a state is a persistent objector customary 
international law is binding on all states,41 and this arguably should apply to 
the UN. Nevertheless, while international legal personality gives the UN the 
capacity to hold duties and rights, the actual possession of specific obligations 
including ones of due diligence remains uncertain until the UN internalises 
these obligations. In general terms, it would be crippling for the legitimacy of 
the UN for it to deny that it is bound by the external rules of the international 
order it has helped to create, moreover a legal order that it is at the heart of. As 
stated by Verdirame, it would ‘be extremely disruptive for the international sys-
tem to tolerate the presence of actors that are endowed with legal personality, 
and thus with the legal capacity to operate upon the international plane, but 
are exempt from a body of universally or almost universally accepted rules’.42
In identifying the applicability of human rights law to peacekeeping opera-
tions ‘regardless of the character of the situation’ to which the force is de-
ployed, the authors of the Leuven Manual identify that the primary source of 
obligation on the UN when performing its peacekeeping function is found in 
customary human rights law.43 Nevertheless, there remains uncertainty re-
garding the existence of positive obligations under customary human rights 
law. John Cerone captures the problem in stating that it is unclear whether the 
positive treaty obligations in Article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights have counterparts in customary international law. How-
ever, having said that he accepts the application of such obligations to the UN 
at least when it is exercising sovereign powers over a territory as it did excep-
tionally in Kosovo.44 Although most modern peacekeeping operations do not 
exercise a full range of sovereign powers, they do regularly use a lesser range of 
39 Guglielmo Verdirame, The UN and Human Rights: Who Guards the Guardians? (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) p. 71.
40 Raphael M. Walden, ‘The Subjective Element in the Formation of Customary Interna-
tional Law’, Israel Law Review, vol. 12, 1977, p. 359.
41 Anthea Roberts and Sandesh Sivakumaran, ‘Theory and Reality of the Sources of Interna-
tional Law’, in Malcolm D. Evans (ed), International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
5th edn 2018), p. 96.
42 Verdirame, supra note 39.
43 Gill, Fleck, Boothby and Vanheusden, supra note 7, p. 76–8, 83.
44 John Cerone, ‘Reasonable Measures in Unreasonable Circumstances: A Legal Respon-
sibility Framework for Human Rights Violations in Post-Conflict Territories under UN 
 Administration’, in Nigel D. White and Dirk Klaasen (eds), The UN, Human Rights and 
Post- Conflict Situations (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), p. 59, p. 77.
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public powers (using force to protect civilians and to tackle spoilers, powers of 
arrest and detention, as well as a range of public order powers).45 It is argued 
here that when performing these functions peacekeeping forces as subsidiary 
organs of the UN are bound by positive obligations of human rights law, requir-
ing them to exercise due diligence in protecting the human rights of civilians 
under their authority or within their power.46
In summary, due diligence obligations attach to the UN in regards to its 
peacekeeping operations, either by dint of customary rules of international 
law applicable to it as an international legal person, or, secondly, as the analysis 
in the remaining sections show, via its own internal constitutional order and 
the rules deriving from it.47
5 The Application of Due Diligence to UN Peacekeeping
Outside of Chapter vii resolutions, which arguably now regularly impose due 
diligence obligations under the UN Charter on peacekeeping operations to 
take a range of measures to protect the basic human rights of civilians,48 UN 
45 For discussion of these functions see Gill, Fleck, Boothby and Vanheusden, supra note 7, 
pp. 150–53, p. 159, p. 176.
46 Ibid, p. 268, p. 273, where the authors of the Leuven Manual state that ‘demands for ac-
countability will also be high in situations where Peace Operations directly affect the 
rights of individuals’, and identify that the principle of due diligence operates ‘to guaran-
tee the lawfulness’ of the activities of peacekeeping forces.
47 Henry G. Schermers and Niels M. Blokker, International Institutional Law (Leiden: Marti-
nus Nijhoff, 5th edn, 2011), p. 755; Marten Zwanenberg, ‘Compromise or Commitment? 
Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Obligations for UN Peace Forces’, 
Leiden Journal of International Law, vol. 11, 1998, p. 232.
48 For example, the mandate of the UN Mission to South Sudan (unmiss) states, inter alia, 
that the Security Council, acting under Chapter vii of the UN Charter, ‘4. Decides that 
the mandate of unmiss shall be as follows, and authorizes unmiss to use all necessary 
means to perform the following tasks: (a) Protection of civilians: (i) To protect civilians 
under threat of physical violence, irrespective of the source of such violence, within its 
capacity and areas of deployment …(ii) To deter violence against civilians, including for-
eign nationals, especially through proactive deployment, active patrolling … in particular 
when the Government of the Republic of South Sudan is unable or failing to provide 
such security; (iii) To implement a mission-wide early warning strategy, including a coor-
dinated approach to information gathering, monitoring, verification, early warning and 
dissemination, and response mechanisms, including response mechanisms to prepare 
for further potential attacks on United Nations personnel and facilities; (iv) To maintain 
public safety and security within and of unmiss protection of civilians sites; (v) To ex-
ercise good offices, confidence-building, and facilitation in support of the mission’s pro-
tection strategy, especially in regard to women and children …; (vi) To foster a secure 
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doctrine and practice on due diligence do not demonstrate a clear acceptance 
of external due diligence obligations arising under international human rights 
law. This is especially so given that there are some instances in peacekeeping 
practice where due diligence should apply to the UN, but the UN does not ap-
pear to accept it has obligations in this regard. The failure to take measures to 
prevent cholera in Haiti seems to be a breach of a duty of care by the UN and a 
lack of due diligence to take measures to protect the rights of the population of 
Haiti. While discussion of Haiti has been largely about the legality and legiti-
macy of the UN’s use of immunity to protect itself from national courts,49 the 
failure to screen or to ensure the screening of the contingent from Nepal and 
to ensure that proper sanitation was installed in the camp by private contrac-
tors engaged by minustah,50 demonstrate that the UN did not achieve the 
requisite level of care in fulfilling its obligations to respect and protect the life 
and health of the people of Haiti. Nevertheless, the UN has only accepted ‘mor-
al responsibility to the victims of the cholera epidemic in Haiti’,51 indicating 
that there is still a long way to go towards the UN fully accepting that it is 
bound by legal obligations of due diligence.
The UN’s ability to protect itself from national courts by invoking its immu-
nity may be called into question in future cases following a recent judgment of 
the US Supreme Court. In Jam v International Finance Corporation (ifc), the US 
Supreme Court dismissed the ifc’s reliance on absolute immunity in the face 
of a mass claim brought by victims of environmental and health damage 
caused by the negligent construction of an ifc financed power station in In-
dia. The potential impact of this judgment on the UN’s continuing reliance on 
absolute immunity to protect its independence from states is unclear.52 Adapt-
ing a form of restrictive immunity to the UN would suggest that, if the Supreme 
Court’s approach takes hold in the jurisprudence of national courts, the UN’s 
claim to immunity in a case like Haiti might not be upheld by those courts. The 
 environment for the eventual safe and voluntary return of internally-displaced persons 
(idps) and refugees including, where compatible and in strict compliance with the Unit-
ed Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (hrdpp), through monitoring of, ensur-
ing the maintenance of international human rights standards by, and specific operational 
coordination with the police services in relevant and protection-focused tasks, in order to 
strengthen protection of civilians’ – UN Doc. S/res/2155, 27 May 2014.
49 Georges v United Nations, US Court of Appeals 2nd Circuit, No. 15-455-cv, 18 August 2016. 
See article by Yohei Okada in this issue.
50 See Alejando Cravioto, ‘Final Report of the Independent Panel of Experts on the Cholera 
Outbreak in Haiti’, 4 May 2011. See contribution of Martina Buscemi in this issue.
51 UN Doc. A/res/71/161, 13 January 2017. See also UN Secretary General’s Report, ‘A New 
Approach to Cholera in Haiti’, UN Doc. A/71/620, 25 November 2016.
52 Jam v International Finance Corporation, 586 U.S. (2019).
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distinction drawn in sovereign immunity claims between sovereign and com-
mercial acts is not automatically applicable to the immunity of the UN.53 How-
ever, as has been said the UN does exercise public powers in the performance 
of its peacekeeping functions, for instance the power of detention,54 the right 
to use potentially lethal force, and sometimes lawmaking making powers as in 
Kosovo.55 These should continue to be covered by the organisation’s immunity, 
but in acts outside of that, for example in engaging private contractors to con-
struct sanitation facilities for peacekeepers, the arguments for immunity to 
protect the UN’s ability to perform its functions do not appear convincing. In-
deed, the justification for invoking immunity in these circumstances seems to 
be to prevent crippling damages being awarded against the UN. Nevertheless, 
the absolute form of immunity seemingly found in the Convention on Privi-
leges and Immunities 1946, Article 2, remains a massive, possibly insurmount-
able obstacle given the caveats found in the Supreme Court’s judgment,56 and 
the UN’s consistent invocation of such immunity when faced with mass claims 
against it.
Despite significant inconsistencies in practice, and the obscuring effect of 
assertions of immunity by the UN, which even if accepted do not absolve the 
UN from responsibility, UN peacekeeping doctrine indicates acceptance by the 
UN that it must take at least some measures to respect and protect human 
rights. However, the resultant due diligence framework remains quite basic. In 
particular, the UN’s duties towards individuals remain underdeveloped. As a 
duty bearer the UN’s due diligence not only extends to taking measures to en-
sure that tcns comply with their human rights obligations to protect the rights 
of individuals within their jurisdiction, but also means that the UN owes duties 
53 Julian Arato, ‘Equivalence and Translation: Further thoughts on io Immunities in Jam v. 
ifc’, ejil Talk, 11 March 2019.
54 Bruce Oswald, ‘Detention by United Nations Peacekeepers: Searching for Definition and 
Categorisation’, Journal of International Peacekeeping, vol. 15, 2011, p. 119.
55 Alexandros Yannis, ‘The UN as Government in Kosovo’, Global Governance, vol. 10, 2004, 
p. 67.
56 Especially the idea that the restrictive approach is only the ‘default’ rule in the absence of 
a stronger form of immunity specified by the organisation’s own charter or rules such as 
those contained in the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the UN 1946 – Chief 
Justice Roberts in Jam v ifc, supra note 62, p. 14. See also the potentially limited nature of 
the commercial activities of organisations, and the requirement under US law that any 
commercial activity must have sufficient nexus to United States – Chief Justice Roberts in 
Jam v ifc, supra note 62, pp. 14–15. On 14 February 2020, on remand of the case from the 
Supreme Court, the District Court of Columbia revisited the issue and upheld the ifc’s 
immunity, the Court confining itself to examining whether the action has sufficient nexus 
to the US, which it found it did not – Jam v International Finance Corporation, Case 1:15-cv-
00612-jdb Document 61, 14 February 2020.
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of due diligence to the rights holders, namely individuals within its power. In 
terms of internalising due diligence obligations there is more evidence that the 
UN is increasingly accepting its due diligence obligations towards tcns, but is 
more reluctant to accept that it has due diligence obligations towards individ-
uals in the host state. The UN may contract its peacekeeping function to tcns, 
but their soldiers are present in a host state as UN peacekeepers, which means 
that the UN’s duties to ensure that its peacekeepers do not violate human 
rights cannot stop at the level of UN-tcn relations but must extend in princi-
ple to the population of the host state. In practice, those due diligence obliga-
tions will only be triggered where the UN has the power to prevent abuse of 
individuals within the host state’s population.
It is worth noting that in its 2018 resolution on ‘United Nations Peacekeep-
ing Operations’ the Security Council affirmed its support for the ‘development 
of a comprehensive and integrated performance policy framework that identi-
fies clear standards of performance for evaluating all United Nations civilian 
and uniformed personnel’; while urging that all tcns ‘meet UN performance 
standards for personnel, training, and equipping’.57 There is a drive by the UN 
to improve peacekeeping performance and management but the question re-
mains as to how that might translate into meaningful due diligence obliga-
tions.58 It is also questionable whether UN practice is heading towards the 
implementation of due diligence obligations in a human rights law sense, or 
whether it is developing a doctrine of due diligence more akin to that used in 
the business community: ‘due diligence is normally understood to mean differ-
ent things by human rights lawyers and by business people … human rights 
lawyers understand due diligence as a standard of conduct required to dis-
charge an obligation, whereas business people normally understand due dili-
gence as a process to manage business risks’.59 Nevertheless, three tentative 
examples of emerging institutional practice and their implications for the ex-
istence of both primary and secondary rules of due diligence applicable to the 
UN are outlined here.60
57 UN Doc. S/res/2436, 21 September 2018, paras. 1 and 3.
58 See, more generally, unsg Report, ‘Shifting the management paradigm in the United Na-
tions: implementing a new management architecture for improved effectiveness and 
strengthened accountability’ UN Doc. A/72/492/Add.2, 21 March 2018, especially paras. 5, 
6, 63, 65, 66 and 105 on risk management and accountability.
59 Jonathan Bonnitcha and Robert McCorquodale, ‘The Concept of Due Diligence in the UN 
Guiding Principles on Human Rights’, European Journal of International Law, vol. 28, 2017, 
p. 900.
60 For a detailed review of UN doctrine and practice see Nigel D. White, ‘Due Diligence, the 
UN and Peacekeeping’ in Heike Krieger and Anne Peters (eds), Due Diligence in Interna-
tional Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2021).
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6 Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (sea)
The Secretary General’s 2003 Bulletin on sexual abuse exhibited some due dili-
gence characteristics in that it was directed at providing measures of protec-
tion for individuals from sea by UN peacekeepers. The Bulletin states that the 
Head of Mission ‘shall be responsible for creating and maintaining an environ-
ment that prevents sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, and shall take appro-
priate measures for this purpose’. In particular, the Head of Mission ‘shall in-
form his or her staff of the contents of the present bulletin’.61 Furthermore, the 
Bulletin provided a limited form of due diligence in relation to third parties 
but specifically when the UN has entered into arrangements with them, by 
providing that UN officials shall inform them of the standards of conduct, and 
‘shall receive a written undertaking from those entities or individuals that they 
accept these standards’. Furthermore, it stated that the ‘failure of those entities 
or individuals to take preventive measures against sexual exploitation or sexu-
al abuse, to investigate allegations thereof, or to take corrective action when 
sexual exploitation or sexual abuse has occurred, shall constitute grounds for 
termination of any cooperative arrangement with the United Nations’.62
However, in large part, the 2003 Bulletin restricted appropriate due dili-
gence measures of prevention to informing peacekeepers of the contents of 
the Bulletin. In terms of remedies, the possibility of referral to national prose-
cuting authorities,63 is insufficient given the normal weaknesses of the host 
state’s criminal justice system and the unwillingness of tcns to punish offend-
ers. Of further concern are the limited preventive measures to be taken when 
engaging non-UN entities, which are restricted to duties of informing such en-
tities of the standards, and termination of the arrangements if those entities 
fail to comply with those standards.
Due to the serious problem of on-going sea by peacekeepers the UN has 
increased its preventive measures, particularly in the form of the screening of 
peacekeepers.64 Bearing in mind the introduction of cholera into Haiti by 
61 UN Secretariat, ‘Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual 
abuse’, UN Doc. st/sgb/2003/13, 9 October 2003, section 4 ‘Duties of Heads of Depart-
ment, Offices and Missions’, para. 4.1.
62 Ibid. section 6.
63 Ibid. section 5.
64 UN Policy on Human Rights Screening of United Nations Personnel, 11 December 2012 
(https://police.un.org/sites/default/files/policy_on_human_rights_screening_of_un_per-
sonnel_december_2012.pdf accessed on 7 September 2020). See also unsg Report, ‘Spe-
cial measures for protection from sexual exploitation and abuse’, UN Doc. A/73/744, 14 
February 2019; unsg Report, ‘Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation 
and abuse: a new approach’, UN Doc A/71/818, 28 February 2017. As regards UN staff 
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peacekeepers, screening should be extended to reduce the risk of peacekeep-
ers being the carriers of disease as well as being the source of human rights 
abuse (if, for instance, they have criminal convictions for violence as well as 
sexual abuse), and the UN should exclude contributions from tcns having 
poor track records in this regard. There is some uneven practice to support this. 
For example, in a Resolution adopted in 2016, the Security Council endorsed 
the Secretary General’s decision to repatriate a particular military unit ‘where 
there is credible evidence of widespread or systemic sexual exploitation and 
abuse’. It also requested that the Secretary General replace all military units of 
a tcn where allegations have been made of sea and the tcn had not taken 
appropriate steps to investigate the allegation, and ensure that replacements 
met UN standards of conduct. It welcomed the efforts of the Secretary General 
to expand vetting of all UN peacekeeping personnel to ensure that they do not 
have a history of sexual misconduct.65
None of these initiatives or measures, however, indicate that the UN is pre-
pared to accept responsibility for a failure to prevent sea by its peacekeepers. 
Indeed, the UN does not accept liability for the off-duty acts of its peacekeep-
ers.66 However, as Athena Nguyen points out: ‘conduct such as sea may not be 
provided for in the rules of the organisation but this does not necessarily ex-
empt the UN from responsibility’.67 Furthermore, ‘this argument may be even 
stronger for conduct that is systemic, widespread, and ongoing, as acts of sea 
by UN peacekeeping personnel appear to be’.68 Article 8 of ario 2011 provides 
that the ultra vires conduct of an ‘organ or agent’ is an act of the UN ‘if the or-
gan or agent acts in an official capacity and within the overall functions of that 
organization’.69 While this may mean it is difficult to attribute sea conduct 
directly to the UN because it is committed in private, the UN remains respon-
sible for its own failure to prevent sea conduct from being committed by 
peacekeepers. After examining the ilc’s Commentaries on this aspect of the 
ario, Ngyuen states that ‘the mere fact that the conduct was undertaken in 
an  off-duty capacity does not necessarily exclude the responsibility of the 
 members see unsg’s Bulletin, ‘Addressing discrimination, harassment, including sexual 
harassment, and abuse of authority’ UN Doc. st/sgb/2019/8, 10 September 2019, which at 
para 3.3 lists the ‘obligations of heads of entities’ to include at (e) ‘exercise due diligence 
by screening job candidates … during recruitment processes’.
65 UN Doc. S/res/2272, 11 March 2016.
66 ‘Memorandum to the Director, Office for Field Operational and External Support Activi-
ties’ [1986] United Nations Juridical Yearbook 300.
67 Athena M. Nguyen, ‘Sexual Exploitation and Abuse on Peacekeeping Operations: Is the 
United Nations Responsible?’, Journal of International Peacekeeping, vol. 19, 2015, p. 166.
68 Ibid.
69 ario 2011, Article 8.
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 international organisation if the conduct breached an obligation of prevention 
that may exist under international law’.70 Nguyen concludes that the UN ‘may 
still bear responsibility for the conduct of its peacekeeping personnel if the 
“off-duty” misconduct breached the UN’s positive obligations to prevent this 
misconduct’.71 However, as Ferstman relates, UN practice has fallen consider-
ably short of this: ‘the UN does not see itself as having any obligation to enter-
tain claims concerning its own liability for sexual exploitation and abuse alle-
gations which occur under its watch; instead, it has carved out a much more 
limited role for itself – supporting efforts of troop contributing countries to 
investigate and prosecute criminal allegations and encouraging states to ad-
dress paternity and child support claims, and to explore the possible use of ex 
gratia payments to victims’.72 In other words the UN has taken some tentative 
steps to recognising that it has due diligence obligations in its relations with 
tcns, but not so in relation to victims of peacekeeping sea.
7 The Protection of Civilians
At a general level the UN’s due diligence obligations to ensure respect for hu-
man rights by peacekeepers include the adoption of measures such as clear 
rules, training, education, risk assessment and mitigation, but also to ensure 
a peacekeeping force has adequate resources and the capabilities to fulfil its 
mandate.73 More specifically, the ambit of due diligence extends to require 
that the UN puts in place reasonable measures to ensure that peacekeepers 
actively protect the human rights of civilians in their areas of deployment 
from violation by non-UN actors. Such measures, scattered unevenly and not 
70 Nguyen, supra note 67.
71 Ibid. See further Carla Ferstman, ‘Reparations for Mass Torts Involving the United  Nations: 
Misguided Exceptionalism in Peacekeeping Operations’, International Organizations Law 
Review, vol. 16, 2019, p. 57. See also the Trust Fund in Support of Victims of Sexual Exploita-
tion and Abuse, as indicated in unsg Report, ‘Special measures for protection from sexu-
al exploitation and sexual abuse’, UN Doc. A/69/779, 13 February 2015. The Trust Fund 
supports UN and non-UN entities and organisations that provide victim assistance and 
support services (but not victim compensation) in accordance with the United Nations 
Comprehensive Strategy on Assistance and Support to Victims of Sexual Exploitation and 
Abuse by United Nations Staff and Related Personnel, annexed to UN Doc. A/res/62/214, 
21 December 2007.
72 Ferstman, supra note 71, pp. 58–9.
73 Nigel D. White, ‘The Use of Weapons in Peace Operations’ in Stuart Casey-Maslen (ed), 
Weapons under International Human Rights Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014) pp. 228–38.
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always convincingly in UN doctrine (for example in Security Council Resolu-
tions, the Brahimi Report, Capstone Doctrine, and the Report of the High Level 
 Independent Panel on Peace Operations), include proactive patrolling, rapid 
redeployment, adequately protected safe havens, intercessions, detention of 
individuals on security grounds, and the use of potentially lethal force where 
absolutely necessary to protect the lives of civilians and peacekeepers.74
A detailed analysis of key UN documents to uncover indications of whether 
these measures could be said to flow from duties of due diligence has been 
undertaken elsewhere.75 The purpose here is to try to understand whether it is 
possible to identify a due diligence obligation on the UN to protect civilians, 
and to consider the implications of a failure to fulfil that obligation. According 
to Willmot and Sheeran the ‘most important rights’ for the protection of civil-
ians in peacekeeping ‘include the right to life, the prohibition against torture 
and ill-treatment, and the freedom from arbitrary detention’. However, in 
terms of the duty bearer, Willmot and Sheeran point to the host state as the 
main actor when stating that ‘[t]hese are human rights that any host state will 
have an obligation to respect and ensure respect for (that is, a positive obliga-
tion), including by non-state actors’.76 They concede that the application of 
human rights law ‘to UN peacekeeping operations is difficult to contest’, al-
though they state that ‘the precise content of these obligations’ is unclear: ‘[t]
he UN is not party to human rights treaties and the greatest difficulty lies in 
understanding the scope and extent of obligations for a UN force, which has no 
sovereignty over a territory and has lesser powers than a state’.77
However, this understates the growth in public powers exercised by the UN 
in its modern stabilisation-type peace operations.78 As Alexander Guilder has 
written such forces ‘are mandated to support the extension of state authority’; 
74 See Security Council resolutions on the Protection of Civilians, starting with UN Doc. 
S/res/1265, 17 September, 1999 and most recently UN Doc. S/res/2474, 11 June 2019 ; Re-
port of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report), UN Doc 
A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000, paras. 62–3; undpko, ‘Capstone Doctrine: United 
Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines’, 18 January 2008, pp. 23–7; 
Report of the High Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on Uniting our 
Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People, UN Doc. A/70/95-S/2015/446, 2015 
(hippo Report), 16 June 2015, paras. 87, 88, 91, 95, 213, 232, 264, 265, 289.
75 White, supra note 60.
76 Heidi Willmot and Scott Sheeran, ‘The Protection of Civilians Mandate in UN Peacekeep-
ing Operations: Reconciling Protection Concepts and Practices’, International Review of 
the Red Cross, vol. 95, 2013, p. 526.
77 Ibid, p. 527.
78 UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo (monusco); UN Multidimen-
sional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (minusca); UN 
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (minusma).
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‘they operate alongside state forces and actively build the capacity of those 
forces’; ‘they use varying degrees of proactive, robust force to prevent attacks 
on themselves and those they are mandated to protect’; and ‘lastly, they have 
mandates to support (re)establishing the rule of law’.79 More specifically such 
forces exercise powers of arrest, detention and regularly use potentially lethal 
force,80 which can cross the threshold into the sort of protracted armed vio-
lence that triggers the application of international humanitarian law to such 
forces.81 In such conditions of violence, Willmot and Sheeran identify a poten-
tial positive or due diligence obligation on the UN ‘to ensure respect’ for inter-
national human rights law ‘by others such as non-state actors, private individu-
als and even local authorities’.82 This signifies that ‘a failure to intervene may 
also violate’ the human rights obligations ‘owed by UN peacekeepers to the 
host state’s population’.83 In the extreme instance of the loss of life at Srebren-
ica, the victims’ families succeeded in a claim against the troop sending state 
of the peacekeepers (The Netherlands),84 the UN being protected from liabili-
ty by its immunity before national courts.85 However, the Netherlands’ Su-
preme Court ultimately decided that the liability of the Netherlands was for 
the conduct of peacekeepers under the effective control of the state rather 
than the failure to take measures to prevent genocide.86 In this way, the Court 
managed to restrict the Netherlands’ liability to 10%,87 when the adoption of a 
79 Alexander Gilder, ‘The Effect of “Stabilization” in the Mandates and Practice of UN Peace 
Operations’, Netherlands International Law Review, vol. 66, 2019, p. 51.
80 Bruce ‘Ossie’ Oswald, ‘Detention by United Nations Peacekeepers: Searching for Defini-
tion and Categorisation’, Journal of International Peacekeeping, vol. 15, 2011, p. 130.
81 unsg, Observance by United Nations forces of international humanitarian law, UN Doc. 
st/sgb/1999/13, 6 August 1999.
82 Willmot and Sheeran, supra note 76, p. 527.
83 Ibid. p. 537.
84 Cedric Ryngaert and Otto Spijkers, ‘The End of the Road: State Liability for Acts of UN 
Peacekeeping Contingents After the Dutch Supreme Court’s Judgment in Mothers of Sre-
brenica’, Netherlands International Law Review, vol. 66, 2019, p. 538.
85 Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and Others v The Netherlands, Decision of the European 
Court of Human Rights, Application No 65541/12, 11 June 2013.
86 Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica et al v the State of the Netherlands and the United Na-
tions, Netherlands Supreme Court, Case No 17/04567, 19 July 2019, paras. 3.5.2–3.5.3. As 
Tom Dannenbaum states: ‘[t]his is a step backwards. The power-to-prevent standard … 
 recognizes the levers of control retained by the state in peacekeeping operations (troop 
selection and promotion, training, disciplinary authority, and criminal jurisdiction) as 
necessarily relevant to the attribution of wrongful conduct by its troops’ – ‘A Disappoint-
ing End of the Road for the Mothers of Srebrenica Litigation in the Netherlands’, ejil Talk. 
23 July 2019.
87 Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica (Netherlands Supreme Court), supra note 96, para. 6. For 
a fuller discussion of this case see the contribution of Yohei Okada in this issue.
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due diligence standard would have suggested a greater proportion, moreover 
that such responsibility should be shared with the UN.
8 The UN’s Due Diligence Policy of 2013 and Non-UN Forces
The UN’s Due Diligence Policy of 2013,88 in which the UN undertakes to imple-
ment measures to ensure that non-UN forces it supports are not committing 
war crimes, is a step forward in the sense that it expressly recognises due dili-
gence can be applicable to the UN. The Policy expressly accepts the UN’s due 
diligence obligations in relation to non-UN forces, but arguably it also opens 
the door to more general positive obligations to take measures to prevent and 
respond to violations by third parties by accepting the applicability of human 
rights law, international humanitarian law and refugee law to the UN.89 The 
wider import of the Policy is found in the statement that: ‘[a]dherence to the 
human rights due diligence policy is important to maintain the legitimacy, 
credibility and public image of the United Nations and to ensure compliance 
with the Charter and with the Organization’s obligations under international 
law’.90
The Policy accepts that the UN must take precautions to assess the risk of 
violation and respond to violations by non-UN forces it supports, including 
intercession with the entity in question and if necessary the removal of sup-
port. Specifically when the UN is contemplating involvement with non-UN se-
curity forces it ‘must therefore pursue a policy of due diligence’ consisting of: 
an assessment of ‘the risk of the recipient entity committing grave violations 
of international humanitarian law, human rights law or refugee law’; ‘transpar-
ency with receiving entities about the legal obligations binding the Organiza-
tion and the core principles governing provision of support’; and an ‘effective 
implementation framework’ including procedures for monitoring compliance 
and interceding.91
Standing alone this represents a positive and explicit development towards 
accepting that the UN has human rights due diligence obligations to take a 
series of precautionary, preventive and responsive measures to ensure that a 
state or non-state security actor working alongside UN peacekeepers does not 
commit grave violations of human rights or other international norms. This 
88 ‘Human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations 
security forces’, UN Doc. A/67/775-S/2013/110, 5 March 2013.
89 Ibid. para. 1.
90 Ibid. para. 3.
91 Ibid. para. 2.
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Policy establishes that the UN owes due diligence obligations in its relation-
ships with non-UN security actors. However, its adoption by the UN raises the 
question of the UN’s wider due diligence obligations to the host population to 
take positive measures through its peacekeepers to address potential or actual 
abusive actions committed by any violent non-UN actor who operates in areas 
to which peacekeepers are deployed.
9 Conclusion
This contribution has focused on the application, acceptance, and implemen-
tation of human rights due diligence obligations in UN peacekeeping opera-
tions. It has concentrated on identifying the applicability of primary rules of 
due diligence to the UN. This article has pointed to growing evidence of the 
development of standards and measures by the UN that would fit the meaning 
and purpose of due diligence, although there are very few instances of due dili-
gence expressly being used as a term within the UN. This is not to say that such 
obligations are not applicable to the UN. It has been argued that due diligence 
obligations are applicable either through customary human rights law, or the 
internal law of the UN, or both. The development of measures such as screen-
ing peacekeepers, blacklisting tcns with poor track records in preventing and/
or punishing perpetrators of sea, are designed to prevent peacekeepers from 
doing harm.92
As well as measures to prevent abuse by peacekeepers, the contribution has 
identified a number of positive measures in UN peacekeeping practice de-
signed to reduce loss of civilian life or other serious human rights violations of 
the host state’s population including: proactive patrolling, weapons training, 
temporary and reviewable preventive detention, protection of UN compounds 
and camps, the identification of threats and risks and strategies to address 
these, including addressing the ‘risk averse’ approach of many tcns.93
Responsibility for human rights violations caused by the failure to adopt 
and carry out these measures should be shared between the tcns and the 
UN,94 and oversight should be secured by an independent review process 
92 Rosa Freedman, ‘UNaccountable: A New Approach to Peacekeepers and Sexual Abuse’, 29 
European Journal of International Law, vol. 29, 2018, p. 963.
93 Cruz Report, ‘Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers: We need to change the 
way we are doing business’, 19 December 2017, p. 5.
94 The current unsg’s Action for Peacekeeping initiative, the Declaration of Shared Com-
mitments on UN Peacekeeping Operations signed up to by member states on 16 August 
2018, contains a collective commitment ‘to ensuring the highest level of peacekeeping 
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tasked with reviewing and developing standards and positive measures to 
 secure them. This review process should lead to the recommendation of stan-
dards, measures, changes, and remedies where peacekeeping forces have man-
ifestly failed to fulfil their obligations of due diligence. Such standards, 
measures and mechanisms should be gathered together and included in a new 
UN Secretary General’s Bulletin on measures to protect human rights in peace-
keeping operations.95
In developing an accountability framework,96 it will be necessary to under-
stand the role of secondary rules in engaging the liability of the UN for failing 
to exercise due diligence. Article 4 of the ario specifies that there is an inter-
nationally wrongful act when ‘conduct consisting of an act or omission’ is at-
tributable to the organisation and constitutes a breach of an obligation owed 
by the organisation. The inclusion of ‘omission’ is a secondary rule which sup-
ports the primary rules of due diligence. In other words there are primary rules 
of due diligence incumbent on the UN, for example to take measures through 
its peacekeeping operations to prevent human rights abuses, so that the UN’s 
failure to act i.e. its failure to take such measures, constitutes an internationally 
wrongful omission that can give rise to responsibility under the secondary 
rules of international law. In terms of attribution, while there may well not be 
sufficient control exerted by the UN over peacekeeping acts to engage Article 7 
of ario, the failure to take measures is an omission by a subsidiary organ of 
the UN, and therefore engages Article 6 of ario.97
The development of a coherent and consistent concept of due diligence for 
UN peacekeeping would involve the identification and enhancement of the 
UN’s institutional due diligence obligations, for example through consistent 
Security Council decision-making, and by the adoption of clear procedural 
due diligence obligations such as human rights risk assessment by the UN Sec-
retariat. There is admittedly limited and uneven evidence of emerging stan-
dards in this regard, as well as a growing sense that the UN has to exercise a 
certain amount of due diligence as regards tcns and non-UN security forces 
it supports. However, the approach taken in this contribution considers the 
performance, and to hold all civilian and uniformed peacekeepers, particularly leader-
ship, accountable for effective performance under common parameters while addressing 
performance shortfalls. The Secretary-General commits to develop an integrated perfor-
mance policy framework based on clear standards for all actors’ (https://peacekeeping 
.un.org/en/action-for-peacekeeping-a4p accessed 7 September 2020).
95 Willmot and Sheeran, supra note 76, p. 527.
96 For a fuller understanding of accountability, especially non-judicial forms, see the contri-
bution of Norihito Samata in this issue.
97 Ferstman, supra note 71, p. 58.
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 substantive positive human rights obligations the UN owes to rights holders 
especially civilians within the host state, and identifies the measures that can 
reasonably be taken by the UN and its peacekeepers to ensure those rights 
are protected given the inherent limitations in the way forces are structured. 
Only by starting with the rights of vulnerable people can a human rights law 
approach to the due diligence obligations of the UN be realised. Put simply, 
when the UN promises to protect civilians in countries to which it deploys 
peacekeepers it needs to take care to ensure that this happens. As stated in the 
Brahimi Report 2000, with reference to the failure of peacekeeping in Rwan-
da: ‘peacekeepers – troops or police – who witness violence against civilians 
should be presumed to be authorised to stop it, within their means, in support 
of basic United Nations principles and . . . consistent with the “perception and 
the expectation of protection created by [an operation’s] very presence”’.98
98 Brahimi Report, supra note 74, para. 62, citing the Report of the Independent Inquiry on 
Rwanda UN Doc. S/1999/1257, 15 December 1999, p. 51.
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